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Abstract: Researchers have reported mispricing in index options markets. This study further examines
the efficiency of the S&P 500 index options market by testing theoretical pricing relationships implied
by no-arbitrage conditions. The effect of a traded stock basket, Standard and Poor’s Depository Receipts
(SPDRs), on the link between index and options markets is also examined. Pricing efficiency within
options markets improves, and the evidence supports the hypothesis that a stock basket enhances the
connection between markets. However, when transactions costs and short sales constraints are included,
very few violations of the pricing relationships are reported.
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I. Introduction
The no-arbitrage principle is a powerful tool in the pricing of financial assets because it does
not rely on strong assumptions about traders’ behavior or market price dynamics.  The principle
simply assumes that if riskless profit opportunities exist, arbitrageurs enter the market and quickly
eliminate the mispricing.  Arbitrage is critical to ensure market efficiency because it forces asset prices
to return to their fundamental values.  In some situations, market frictions limit arbitrage so that
arbitrageurs just cannot take advantage of the profit opportunities presented by mispricing.  For
example, in a market with capital constraints, arbitrageurs may be ineffective in their attempts to
move the market toward an efficient state if they cannot raise the capital necessary to form the
riskfree portfolio (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).
Some earlier studies report evidence of mispricing of index call and put options in the United
States (Evnine and Rudd (1985), Chance (1986), (1987)) and Canada (Ackert and Tian (1998a)),
though arbitrage may be limited due to liquidity risk (Kamara and Miller (1995)).  Liquidity risk arises
from the possibility of an adverse price movement before a desirable trade can be executed.  If options
are priced inefficiently, an arbitrage transaction requires trade in multiple assets and, in the case of
index options, one of these assets is itself a stock portfolio consisting of many assets.  Thus,
mispricing may not be an indication of market inefficiency because the asset underlying the options
is not easily or costlessly reproduced.  To arbitrage from mispriced stock index options an investor
may need to replicate the index, i.e., the investor may need to buy or sell a basket of stocks that is
perfectly correlated with the index.  This can be difficult and costly even for large investors. 2
In the 1990s stock exchanges introduced index derivative products that replicate stock baskets
and trade just like any other share of stock.  These products are not actively managed and  are
designed to track an existing stock index.  For example, since March 1990 investors in Canada are
able to trade Toronto Index Participation Units (TIPs) which are constructed to track the
performance of the Toronto 35 index.   In the United States, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
introduced Standard and Poor’s Depository Receipts (SPDRs), or spiders, in January 1993.  This
index derivative product is designed to replicate the S&P 500 stock index.  Efficiency should be
enhanced with the introduction of these traded stock baskets because market participants can easily
replicate the asset underlying index option contracts.
The objective of this study is to empirically examine the efficiency of the market for S&P 500
index options.  Earlier studies find frequent violations of theoretical option pricing relationships.  In
addition to providing new results on the efficiency of the S&P 500 index options market, our study
extends this research by examining the effect of a traded stock basket on the effectiveness of
information exchange between index and option markets and on option market efficiency.  We
investigate whether index options are priced correctly relative to one another by testing theoretical
pricing relationships implied by no-arbitrage conditions, both before and after the inception of SPDRs
trading.  These no-arbitrage conditions place bounds on possible call and put option prices (boundary
conditions, call and put spreads, and convexity) and imply relative pricing relationships between put
and call option prices (put-call parity, box spread).  We compare the number and size of violations
in S&P 500 index option relations before and after the introduction of SPDRs.  Significant violations
of pricing relations across option and stock markets (boundary conditions and put-call parity) after
the introduction of SPDRs may indicate market inefficiency because arbitrage based on these3
violations can be executed with relatively low cost and effort with the trading of a stock basket.
Other arbitrage relations we examine are independent of the stock price (box, call, and put spreads
and convexity).  These tests provide insight into how the efficiency of the options market has evolved
over time and are not dependent on simultaneous data from options and stock markets (Ronn and
Ronn (1989)).
All of the pricing relationships we examine are independent of an option pricing model so that
no assumptions concerning the process underlying the stock price is required.  Thus, empirical tests
of these types of relationships are true tests of market efficiency instead of joint tests of market
efficiency and model specification.  We adjust for discrete dividend payments and recognize the limits
that transactions costs, short sales constraints, and bid-ask spreads place on arbitrage.  We also
examine whether no-arbitrage violations are systematically related to time, the term to maturity,
movements in the stock market, or liquidity risk.  
Since SPDRs were first offered in 1993, the product has become one of the most actively
traded issues on the AMEX.  SPDRs are securities that represent an interest in a trust with
accumulated dividends paid quarterly.  The cash dividend reflects a pro rata amount of regular cash
dividends accumulated by the trust during the preceding quarterly period.  SPDRs are designed to
approximate 1/10th of the value of the S&P 500 index, so that trading prices will fall in the range of
a typical stock.  An investor who holds a prescribed number of SPDRs may actually redeem them for
the underlying stock at any time.  This feature is particularly important because it reduces liquidity
risk and facilitates arbitrage (Ackert and Tian (1998b)).   With this stock basket, investors can trade
a single security that represents a diversified portfolio of the corporations in the S&P 500  index.  
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The results reported subsequently indicate significant mispricing of call and put options both4
before and after the introduction of SPDRs.  We also find that SPDRs trading reduces mispricing and
enhances the connection between markets, ignoring transactions costs and short sales constraints.
However, once transactions costs and constraints on short sales are included in the analysis, we report
a small percentage of violations in boundary conditions and put-call parity over the entire sample
period, consistent with earlier research (Kamara and Miller (1995)).  When we recognize these limits
to arbitrage, we do not observe a significant reduction in the mean boundary or put-call parity
violation after SPDRs are introduced.  Thus, the impact of SPDRs trading is limited in practical terms
because of the significance of other trading costs including commissions, bid-ask spreads, and short
sales constraints.  We also report a decrease in violations of relationships that are independent of the
stock price (box, call, and put spreads and convexity) suggesting an improvement in the pricing of
options relative to each other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section II we review the evidence
concerning the efficiency of index option markets.  In section III we describe our methodology.  The
data employed in our examination of option market efficiency and the empirical results are described
in section IV.  Section V reports the results of additional analysis into the determinants of violations
of pricing relations.  The final section provides discussion of the results and concluding remarks.
II. Efficiency of Index Option Markets
Many empirical studies have tested pricing relations between put and call index options.
Some of these tests are based on theoretical models for option pricing, such as the Black-Scholes
(1973) Option Pricing Model or the Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) Binomial Option Pricing
Model.  Other tests are based on arbitrage arguments and are thus model independent, including tests5
based on boundary conditions, put-call parity, and the box spread.  For example, Evnine and Rudd
(1985) use intra-day data for a two month period in 1984 and find that S&P 100 and Major Market
index options frequently violate boundary conditions and put-call parity.  They also conclude that
these options are significantly mispriced relative to theoretical values based on the Binomial Option
Pricing Model.  Chance (1987) also finds that put-call parity and the box spread are violated
frequently for S&P 100 index options and the violations are significant in size.  However, these
results may not be an indication of market inefficiency for several reasons.
Kamara and Miller (1995) point out that prior to their study, tests of put-call parity use
American options.   Because of the possibility of early exercise, put-call parity may not hold for
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American options.  In their tests using S&P 500 index options that are European, Kamara and Miller
find fewer and smaller violations.
Another reason why tests of put-call parity may not indicate market inefficiency is because
arbitrage at low cost may not have been possible.  In Canada a stock basket, TIPs, has been traded
since 1990.  Ackert and Tian (1998a) examine the efficiency of Canadian index and options markets
by comparing the number and size of violations in theoretical pricing relationships before and after
the introduction of TIPs.  They conclude that although option market efficiency improved over their
test period, the connection between option and stock markets did not.
In summary, the results reported in earlier studies using U.S. data suggest that put-call parity
is frequently violated in index option markets and that these options are often mispriced based on
theoretical models.  This study extends earlier work in several ways.  We test theoretical pricing
relationships based on no-arbitrage conditions for European index options and compare results before
and after introduction of a stock basket (SPDRs) of the underlying index, the S&P 500.  We also6
include the effects of transactions costs, short sales constraints, bid-ask spreads, and discrete dividend
payments.   Finally, we examine whether deviations from pricing relations can be explained by
features of the option and stock markets, including liquidity.
III.  Tests Based on Arbitrage Pricing Relationships
Arbitrage pricing relationships are model independent and are based on the simple assumption
that investors prefer more to less.  If these pricing relationships are violated by actual prices after
adjustment for the bid-ask spread and transactions costs, arbitrage profits may be possible by taking
appropriate long positions in the underpriced asset(s) and appropriate short positions in the
overpriced asset(s).
Several arbitrage pricing relationships are examined in this study.   The first two (boundary
3
conditions, put-call parity) are joint tests of option and stock market efficiency and allow us to
examine the exchange of information between these markets.  The others (box, call, and put spreads
and convexity) test option market efficiency and allow us to examine how pricing has evolved over
time.  As options on the S&P 500 index are European, the discussion below applies to European
options only.  The approach incorporates adjustment for discrete dividend payments.  We define:
C :  bid price of European call option;
b
C :  ask price of European call option;
a
P :  bid price of a European put option;
b
P :  ask price of a European put option;
a
S :  bid price of the index;
b
S :  ask price of the index;
a
X:  strike price;
T:  maturity of the option;
r:  risk-free rate of interest or treasury bill rate;
D:  present value of dividends paid on the index from the current date to date T, discounted at(C a%tc) & max(8S(S b & D)&ts-(Xe &rT%tr), 0) $ 0.




the risk-free rate of interest;
8 : percent of proceed available to short sellers in the stock market; S
t: transactions costs (other than those arising from the bid-ask spread) of buying or selling calls, i
puts, shares, or t-bills, i = c, p, s, or r.
The first arbitrage pricing relationship we examine is the  boundary condition.  The
relationship we test accounts for the bid-ask spread because bid-ask spreads result in significant
transactions costs for participants in options markets (Baesel, Shows, and Thorpe, 1983; Phillips and
Smith, 1980).  The condition is given by the following inequality for a call option:
For a put option the boundary is
These inequalities define the minimum value for call and put options, respectively.  If a boundary
condition is violated, the option is undervalued relative to the index and arbitrage profits are possible
if the index can be replicated at low cost.  For example, if (1a) is violated, the index call option is
underpriced relative to the index.  The arbitrageur would sell the index and buy the call, investing the
balance in a money market account earning the risk-free rate.  In the case of exercise of the call at
maturity, the arbitrageur closes the index position and earns a risk-free profit at time T of [8 (S - D)- S
b 
t  - (C +t )]e  - (X + te ) > 0.  s c r
a rT rT
The second arbitrage pricing relationship examined is put-call parity.  Intuitively, a pair of call
and put options with identical maturity and strike price should be priced correctly relative to each
other.  Mathematically, put-call parity is expressed as follows:(C a%tc) - (P b&tp) + (Xe &rT%tr) - (8S(S b&D)&ts) $ 0





If either of these parity relationships is violated, arbitrage profits are possible when the index can be
replicated at low cost.  The call is underpriced relative to the put if (2a) is violated.  In this case,
arbitrage profits are generated by selling the put and the index and buying the call.  The remainder
of the proceeds is invested in a money market account that earns the risk-free rate.  Similarly, if (2b)
is violated, the put is underpriced relative to the call.  Arbitrage profits are generated by selling the
call and borrowing Xe  at the risk-free rate while at the same time buying the put and the index.
-rT
The next set of arbitrage pricing relationships we investigate includes box, call, and put
spreads and call and put convexity.  As only options are involved, an examination of these
relationships may provide a superior test of parity among index options.   For example, Billingsley
and Chance (1985) and Ronn and Ronn (1989) note that put-call parity tests are joint tests of option
and stock market efficiency whereas tests of the box spread consider only option market efficiency.
Other advantages of these relationships are that they consider only feasible transactions and are
unaffected by the different closing times in stock and option markets.
Efficiency of the option market may improve over time due to factors other than the
introduction of SPDRs.  Box, call, and put spreads and call and put convexity allow us to gauge
whether market efficiency improved over our sample period irrespective of SPDRs trading and
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option market efficiency is enhanced after SPDRs trading is introduced, in addition to examining the
link between the index and option markets using boundary and put-call parity relationships. 
The box spread creates a riskless position by combining vertical call and put spreads.  The
spread relationship between call and put prices is similar to put-call parity as expressed above in (2a)
and (2b) except that two pairs of matched call and put options are used and the index itself is
removed from the relationship.  If bid-ask spreads and transaction costs are taken into account, the
box spread is expressed by the following two inequalities:
and
The call (put) spread combines call (put) options with identical maturity, where X  < X .  The call 1 2
spread is expressed as:
and the put spread as:
Similarly, call (put) convexity creates a riskless position by combining three call (put) options where

















and put convexity is:
where w = (X  - X )/(X  - X ).  If the box, call, or put spreads are violated, arbitrage profits are 3 2 3 1
possible by taking appropriate option positions.  Similarly, if call or put convexity is violated, risk-free
profit opportunities are present in the options market.
All five arbitrage pricing relationships are investigated for S&P 500 index options on each
trading day in our sample, as described in the following section.  The number and size of violations
are recorded and analysed.  In order to lend insight into the effect of trading in a stock basket on the
efficiency of index option markets, we compare the periods prior and subsequent to the introduction
of SPDRs.  If the number and size of violations of relationships (1a) - (2b) are significantly lower in
the later time period, the results suggest that market efficiency may be enhanced by the trading of a
stock basket that replicates the index.  Arbitrage based on these relationships requires a position in
the underlying index and such a position can be taken at lower cost with SPDRs trading.  In addition,
relationships (3a) - (5b) allow us to examine the evolution of the index options market and provide
insight into whether market efficiency increased over our sample period.  Arbitrage based on these
relationships does not require a position in the underlying asset so that SPDRs trading is not expected
to have an effect.11
IV.  Results
SPDRs began trading on the AMEX on January 29, 1993.   We empirically investigate the
efficiency of the S&P 500 index option market during the twenty-four-month period from February
1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  This data set allows us to compare the efficiency of the market
before (February 1, 1992 through January 28, 1993) and after (January 29, 1993 through January 31,
1994) the introduction of the stock basket.  The SPDRs initial trading date divides the test period into
two subperiods with approximately the same number of observations.  Daily closing prices, trading
volume, and open interest for S&P 500 index call and put options are from the Chicago Board
Options Exchange.  SPDR price and dividend data are from the CRSP daily database and S&P 500
index and dividend data are from the Standard and Poor’s Corporation through the DRI database.
The three-month treasury bill rate (our proxy for the risk-free interest rate) is from the Federal
Reserve Bulletin.  Although closing option and stock prices are nonsynchronous, these prices are
representative of prices throughout the day.   Our approach is conservative in that we use bid and ask
4
prices, rather than closing prices, in testing the pricing relationships.   We follow Harris, Sofianos,
5
and Shapiro (1994) and Kamara and Miller (1995) and construct bid and ask prices from closing
prices.  We estimate the option (index) bid-ask spread by adding or subtracting one thirty-second of
a point (one sixteenth) because the typical spread on the options (index) is one sixteenth (one eighth).
On each trading day during the test period, five pricing relationships are tested: boundary
conditions ((1a) and (1b)), put-call parity ((2a) and (2b)), the box spread ((3a) and (3b)), call and put
spreads ((4a) and (4b)), and call and put convexity ((5a) and (5b)).   Boundary conditions are tested
6
for each option individually.  Then, for each maturity month and trading day, all puts and calls with
identical strike prices are matched to examine put-call parity.  There may be more than one pair of12
matched puts and calls for any given maturity month.  Next for each maturity month, two pairs of put
and call options are used to examine the box spread.  The put and call within each pair are matched
with identical strike price, but two different strike prices are used for the two pairs.  In contrast, the
call (put) spread combines two call (put) options with identical maturity and different strike prices.
Finally, call (put) convexity combines three call (put) options with identical maturity and different
strike prices.  
The frequency and severity of violations of the boundary conditions, put-call parity, and the
box spread are tabulated for the two sample periods.  Comparing the extent of boundary condition
7
and put-call parity violations in the subperiods before and after the introduction of SPDRs gives a
clear indication of the effect of trading in a stock basket on option market efficiency.  In addition,
examining violations in box, call, and put spreads and convexity for the two subperiods provides
insight into how the efficiency of the options market has changed over time, independent of the stock
market because arbitrage does not require a position in the underlying index.  We examine the effect
of transactions costs and short sales constraints on pricing efficiency.  Transactions costs include bid-
ask spreads and commissions.  Following Kamara and Miller (1995), commission costs (t) are $30 i
for treasury bills, $2 ($4) per options contract for 100 shares if the price is less than (greater than or
equal to) $1, and $10 for one round lot of stock or 100 shares.
Tables 1 through 6 report the frequency and percentage of violations, as well as the mean
violation in dollars.  We test for significant dollar violations by testing the null hypothesis that the
mean dollar violation is zero.  We also investigate whether the dollar value of violations decreases
after the introduction of SPDRs.  To do so, we use a t-test of the null hypothesis that the mean dollar
violation is equal before and after the introduction of SPDRs.  All reported t-statistics use standard13
errors corrected for autocorrelation using a maximum likelihood procedure with a Gauss-Marquardt
algorithm (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Luktepohl, and Lee, 1985).  
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Tables 1 and 2 report boundary violations for call and put index options before and after the
introduction of SPDRs.  For the call options, the percentage and dollar amount of violations is lower
in the later time period (5.81% and $1.05 versus 5.34% and $0.96), though not significantly so.  For
the put options, the percentage of violations increases (2.04% versus 2.64%) and the mean violation
in dollars decreases ($0.97 versus $0.93), though again the decrease is insignificant.  However, for
call and put options over both subperiods, the mean violation is large and significantly different from
zero.  Overall, when we ignore short sales constraints and commission costs, the tests indicate that
although the  size of the violation is statistically significant, market efficiency is high.  Only
approximately 5% of observations result in violation of the boundary conditions.  When the analysis
reflects commission costs (t > 0) in addition to transaction costs generated by the bid-ask spread, the i
frequency of violations declines substantially.  Furthermore, when arbitrageurs are limited to the use
of 99 percent of short-sales proceeds (8  = 0.99), we observe very few violations.   Although there S
9
is a significant decrease in the mean dollar violation of the call boundary (t = 43.83), only 9 of 16,305
observations results in a violation.  For the put boundary, Table 2 reports not even a single violation
in 24,042 observations.  This result is not surprising because boundary conditions do not place strong
restrictions on pricing.
Tables 3 and 4 report tests of the put-call parity relationships expressed by inequalities (2a)
and (2b).  Many more violations of put-call parity are observed, as compared to the frequency of
boundary violations.  For inequality (2a) the percentage and dollar amount of violations are lower in
the later time period (51.52% and $0.83 versus 38.19% and $0.73) but for inequality (2b) both14
measures  increase over time (36.88% and $0.85 versus 49.91% and $0.87).  We observe  a
statistically significant decrease in the mean violation for inequality (2a) and an insignificant increase
for inequality (2b).  For both inequalities and sample periods we again observe mean violations that
differ significantly from zero.  When the analysis reflects commission costs, the percentage of
violations is cut almost in half.  Furthermore, when we include short sales constraints, we observe
almost no violations of either put-call parity relationship.  Taken together, the results in Tables 3 and
4 suggest that the relative pricing of calls and puts conforms better to put-call parity after the
inception of SPDRs trading.  However, we see little practical impact once the additional costs of
arbitrage are recognized because very few violations existed even in the earlier time period.
The frequency and severity of violations of the box spread, inequalities (3a) and (3b), are
reported in Table 5 and 6.  Note that we do not consider the case of short sales constraints (8 < 1.0) S 
because the spread relationship does not involve transactions in stock.  Again we observe mean dollar
violations that are significantly different from zero before and after the introduction of SPDRs.  For
inequality (3a) the percentage and dollar amount of violations are similar in the period before and
after SPDRs are introduced (35.60% and $0.80 versus 35.78% and $0.79) though we see some
decrease in both for inequality (3b) (40.54% and $0.87 versus 39.13% and $0.81).  Though the
average dollar violations for inequalities (3a) and (3b) decrease after SPDRs trading commenced, the
decline is only significant for (3b).  When commission costs are included in the analysis, the frequency
of violations decreases substantially but the mean dollar value of the violations does not decline.
Although these results  provide some evidence that option market efficiency increased over the two
test periods, the frequency of violations remains high at approximately 20% of observations after
taking into account trading costs.15
To provide further insight, we examine violations of call and put spreads ((4a) and (4b)) and
call and put convexity ((5a) and (5b)).  Though not reported in the tables, we observe significant
mean dollar violations for all four relationships.  However, for all four we also observe a decrease in
the mean dollar violation in the later time period, with three of four decreases significant at the 5%
level.  Furthermore, the maximum percentage of violations across the four inequalities is only 4.36%
(2.36%) when commission costs are ignored (included).  These results suggest that option market
valuations were very close to these theoretical predictions and market efficiency improved over the
sample period.
To further investigate the persistence of violations in pricing relationships, we investigate
whether arbitrage opportunities are evident the day following observed violations.  Although
significant violations of all three pricing relationships are observed, Galai (1977) points out that a true
test of market efficiency must be an ex ante test.  Ex ante test results are reported in Tables 7 through
12 for the boundary conditions, parity relationships, and box spread.  In order to conduct these ex
ante tests, we identify each day on which a particular violation occurs and track whether the violation
persisted on the following trading day.  So, for example, we observe 465 violations of the call
boundary condition (see Table 1) and of those violations, 70 or 15.05% persist on the following day
(see Table 7).  Without exception, the ex ante tests indicate that significant abnormal profit
opportunities existed even the day following the violation of a pricing relationship.  However, when
transactions costs and short sales constraints are included,  we find no ex ante violation of the call and
put boundaries or put-call parity.
As a further check on the robustness of our results, we examined whether violations identified
with the S&P 500 index could be exploited through SPDRs trading (with adjustment for dividends).16
Using data for the period after SPDRs were introduced, we found that even though the tracking
between SPDRs and the index is imperfect, profit opportunities persist.   The majority of the
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violations remain.  The dollar value of violations remains statistically different from zero even though
strategies based on the violations of some relationships require selling under-valued SPDRs.
Taken together, the results suggest that S&P 500 index options are frequently mispriced to
a significant extent.  We observe significant violations of arbitrage pricing relationships even using
ex ante tests and after the introduction of SPDRs.  SPDRs trading appears to have reduced mispricing
in the inter-market relationships ((1a), (1b) ,(2a), and (2b)).  However, for these relationships, when
we recognize the existence of commission costs and constraints on short sales, very few violations
are observed.  SPDRS trading removes one of the limits to arbitrage, but other costs are significant.
Our results indicate that although options market efficiency improved over time, the link between
pricing in options and stock markets is dominated by other constraints on arbitrage.
11
V. Determinants of Violations
Next we use regression analysis to examine the determinants of the size of violations in the
pricing relationships.  Kamara and Miller (1995) examine whether deviations from put-call parity
reflect a premium for liquidity risk, rather than market inefficiency.  Following Kamara and Miller we
measure the violation (the dependent variable in each regression) using the dollar violation ignoring
commission costs and short sales constraints, i.e., the maximum violation.  In addition to examining
the impact of liquidity on price, we investigate whether deviations in prices from theoretical
predictions systematically vary across other market features.  We use a Tobit censored regression
model because when a pricing relationship holds, the dependent variable is censored or unobservable.17
Following Kamara and Miller, we use a bootstrap procedure to take into account nonstandard
residuals.   Our observations are not independent because of overlap in expiration months and strike
12
prices.   The bootstrap involves estimating the Tobit regression 500 times by sampling with
replacement.  The final standard error of the coefficient estimate is the standard deviation of the
vector of 500 coefficient estimates.
The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index options from February 1, 1992
through January 31, 1994.  The independent variables are as follows.  ln*S/X -1* is a measure of
liquidity where S is the S&P 500 index value and X is the strike price.  The risk of an adverse price
movement before a trade can be completed (i.e., liquidity risk) must be compensated.  When liquidity
risk in options trading is high, greater violations in pricing relationships are expected.  Most trading
volume is in near-the-money options and our first independent variable measures how far an option
is from at-the-money (Kamara and Miller (1995)).  For the spread  relationships ((3a) and (3b)) the
liquidity measure is the average liquidity across the two options.   In addition, we include option
volume and open interest as independent variables to proxy for liquidity.
)S&P500 is the change in the S&P 500 index from the previous day’s close and S&P500 is
the closing value of the index.  A large unexpected upward movement in the market would result in
a larger violation if an arbitrage opportunity indicates that stock should be sold.  The converse holds
if an arbitrage profit can be made from a strategy involving buying stock.  Thus, we expect a positive
(negative) coefficient estimate on )S&P500 for (1a) and (2a) ((1b) and (2b))). 
Three final independent variables are included in the Tobit regression.  Term to maturity is
the time in years until the option expires.  Strike price is the exercise price of the option(s) where we
include both the absolute value of the difference in strike prices and the average strike price for the18
spread relationships. Finally, Time is a counter for the trading date and is included to measure the
trend in pricing violations over time.
Table 13 reports the results of the bootstrapped Tobit regression.  The table reports the
bootstrapped coefficient estimates with t-statistics below.  The final row of the table reports an F-
statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero.  These F-statistics
are all highly significant, as are most of the individual coefficient estimates.  Consistent with the
results reported by Kamara and Miller, liquidity is clearly an important determinant of the size of
violations in option pricing relationships.  As expected, violations are larger when an option is farther
from at-the-money so that liquidity is low.  The estimated coefficients for volume and open interest
are also generally consistent with larger violations when liquidity is low.  )S&P500 has the expected
signs for the boundary and parity relationships.  Violations of (1a) and (2a) ((1b) and (2b)) are larger
(smaller) when the stock index moves up because the arbitrageur sells (purchases) the index.  In many
cases the remaining variables (S&P500, Term to Maturity, Strike Price, and Time) significantly
impact the size of pricing violations, though the signs are mixed.
VI.  Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the efficiency of the S&P 500 index option market.  When we
ignore commission costs and constraints on short sales, we report frequent and substantial violations
of theoretical pricing relationships derived from stock index and index option no-arbitrage principles.
Although these results suggest that significant inefficiencies exist in the link between index and option
markets, almost no violations in boundary conditions and put-call parity remain after commission
costs and short sales constraints are recognized.  However, we continue to observe a large number19
of violations in the box spread even after the analysis reflects transactions costs.  Our results also
suggest that liquidity and stock index price movements are important determinants of the size of
dollar violations of pricing relationships.
The results provide support for the hypotheses that options market efficiency improved over
time and that the introduction of SPDRs, a stock basket, improves the link between stock and index
option markets.  Replicating the underlying asset with actual stock trading was not easy or costless
prior to the introduction of SPDRs.  However, even with trading in a stock basket, arbitrage is limited
by other obstacles including transaction costs and short sales constraints.20
1. For further information see Ackert and Tian (1998b).  In addition, the AMEX web site
(www.amex.com) contains detailed information on SPDRs and how they are traded, including a
complete prospectus.
2. As in the early put-call parity studies, Billingsley and Chance (1985) use American options to test
whether the box spread relationship holds across stock options.
3. For derivations of these relationships see Chance (1987), Cox and Rubinstein (1985), and Hull
(1997).
4. The index option market closes at 4:15 (EST) and the stock market closes at 4:00 (EST).   In their
study of index options, Evnine and Rudd (1985) use intra-day data.  They conclude that closing
option prices properly represent prices observed during the trading day.  Thus, in our examination
of option market pricing efficiency, it is not inappropriate to use prices from the close.
5. See Ronn and Ronn (1989) who demonstrate that the use of bid-ask prices is conservative.
6. In relationships involving the underlying asset, results reported in the paper use the S&P 500 index.
We examined the correlation in SPDRs prices and the S&P 500 index.  Over our sample period they
were highly correlated with correlation coefficient of 0.999.  In order to test the sensitivity of our
results, we repeated all analyses using SPDRs as the asset underlying the option.  The conditions we
tested using SPDRs also reflected a discrete dividend stream as SPDRs pay out quarterly.  Although
not reported, the results are similar to those reported subsequently.
7. In some cases, we detected a few extreme outliers.  After checking and re-checking the original
data sources, these outliers remained.  However, when these outliers are removed statistical
inferences are unchanged.
8. Autocorrelation in the dollar violations might be expected because the time to maturity for sample
options may overlap.  Diagnostic tests confirmed the presence of significant positive autocorrelation.
However, inferences are unchanged if OLS standard errors are used.
9. Though not reported, we also examined the number and size of violations when 97 percent of
short-sales proceeds are available following Kamara and Miller (1985).  We observe virtually no
violations of call and put boundary conditions and put-call parity.
10. Although the correlation between SPDRs and the S&P 500 index is 0.999, the SPDRs’ price is
at times out of line with the index.  In general, SPDRs are under-priced when adjusted for dividend
payments (Ackert and Tian (1998b)).
11. Although the conclusions differ, these results are not inconsistent with Ackert and Tian’s (1998a)
study of trading in Canadian options markets.  Ackert and Tian conclude that trading in a stock
basket does not improve the link between option and index markets.  Their study does not investigate
Endnotes21
the effect of other limits to arbitrage, such as commission fees and short sales constraints.
12. In fact, inferences are unaffected when we use Ordinary Least Squares analysis or a standard
Tobit regression model.22
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TABLE 1
Violations of Call Boundary (1a) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 8  = 0.99, t > 0 S i S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 8,002 8,303 8,002 8,303 8,002 8,303
Observations
Number of 465 443 335 304 4 5
Violations
Percentage 5.81 5.34 4.19 3.66 0.05 0.06
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 1.05 0.96 1.05 0.98 1.97 1.31
Standard 1.02 0.95 1.03 1.00 3.22 1.02
Deviation
t-statistic for 22.10*** 21.08*** 18.64*** 17.10*** 1.22 2.87*
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 1.38 0.86 43.83***
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of violations of the call boundary (1a) before and
after the introduction of SPDRs.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8 is the percent of proceeds available to S 
short sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** i
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.25
TABLE 2
Violations of Put Boundary (1b) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 8  = 0.99, t > 0 S i S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 11,499 12,543 11,499 12,543 11,499 12,543
Observations
Number of 235 331 158 231 0 0
Violations
Percentage 2.04 2.64 1.37 1.84 0 0
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.97 0.93 1.03 0.93 0 0
Standard 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.96 0 0
Deviation
t-statistic for 15.38*** 18.23*** 13.22*** 14.71*** - -
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 0.46 1.00 -
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of violations of the put boundary (1b) before and
after the introduction of SPDRs.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994. 8  is the percent of proceeds available to S
short sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** i
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.26
TABLE 3
Violations of Put-Call Parity (2a) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 8  = 0.99, t > 0 S i S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 5,811 5,874 5,811 5,874 5,811 5,874
Observations
Number of 2,994 2,243 1,719 1,094 12 8
Violations
Percentage 51.52 38.19 29.58 18.62 0.21 0.14
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.83 0.73 0.81 0.81 2.76 1.05
Standard 0.81 0.78 0.87 0.86 3.07 1.11
Deviation
t-statistic for 55.95*** 44.49*** 38.64*** 31.31*** 3.11*** 2.82**
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 4.51*** -0.12 149.99***
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of violations of put-call parity (2a) before and after
the introduction of SPDRs.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index options
from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994. 8  is the percent of proceeds available to short S
sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** denote i
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.27
TABLE 4
Violations of Put-Call Parity (2b) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 8  = 0.99, t > 0 S i S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 5,811 5,874 5,811 5,874 5,811 5,874
Observations
Number of 2,143 2,932 1,131 1,618 0 0
Violations
Percentage 36.88 49.91 19.46 27.55 0 0
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.85 0.87 0.95 0.91 0 0
Standard 0.87 0.85 0.93 0.94 0 0
Deviation
t-statistic for 45.63*** 55.00*** 34.40*** 39.20*** - -
nonzero mean
t-statistic for -0.49 1.00 -
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of violations of put-call parity (2b) before and after
the introduction of SPDRs.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index options
from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8  is the percent of proceeds available to short S
sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** denote i
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.28
TABLE 5
Violations of the Box Spread (3a) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 18,796 17,854 18,796 17,854
Observations
Number of 6,691 6,389 3,604 3,399
Violations
Percentage 35.60 35.78 19.17 19.04
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.80 0.79 0.88 0.87
Standard 0.72 0.72 0.75 0.74
Deviation
t-statistic for 90.87*** 87.20*** 70.72*** 68.26***
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 1.30 0.78
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of violations of the box spread (3a) before and after
the introduction of SPDRs.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index options
from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8  is the percent of proceeds available to short S
sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** denote i
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.29
TABLE 6
Violations of the Box Spread (3b) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 18,796 17,854 18,796 17,854
Observations
Number of 7,620 6,987 4,240 3,842
Violations
Percentage 40.54 39.13 22.56 21.52
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.87 0.81 0.95 0.86
Standard 0.84 0.71 0.85 0.73
Deviation
t-statistic for 89.47*** 94.45*** 73.02*** 72.06***
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 4.63*** 5.26***
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of violations of the box spread (3b) before and after
the introduction of SPDRs.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index options
from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8  is the percent of proceeds available to short S
sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** denote i
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.30
TABLE 7
Ex Ante Violations of Call Boundary (1a) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 8  = 0.99, t > 0 S i S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 465 443 335 304 4 5
Observations
Number of 70 62 36 32 0 0
Violations
Percentage 15.05 14.00 10.75 10.53 0 0
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 1.11 0.68 1.22 0.48 0 0
Standard 1.07 0.48 1.12 0.46 0 0
Deviation
t-statistic for 8.71*** 11.12*** 6.55*** 5.89*** 0 0
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 2.92*** 3.52*** 0
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of ex ante violations of the call boundary (1a)
before and after the introduction of SPDRs.  An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation
persists into the following trading day.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8  is the percent of proceeds available to S
short sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** i
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.31
TABLE 8
Ex Ante Violations of Put Boundary (1b) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 8  = 0.99, t > 0 S i S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 235 331 158 231 0 0
Observations
Number of 28 53 13 23 0 0
Violations
Percentage 11.91 16.01 8.23 9.96 0 0
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.69 0.76 0.69 0.80 0 0
Standard 0.64 0.75 0.66 0.86 0 0
Deviation
t-statistic for 5.67*** 7.33*** 3.78*** 4.48*** - -
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 0.41 -0.40 -
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of ex ante violations of the put boundary (1b)
before and after the introduction of SPDRs.  An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation
persists into the following trading day.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8  is the percent of proceeds available to S
short sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** i
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.32
TABLE 9
Ex Ante Violations of Put-Call Parity (2a) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 8  = 0.99, t > 0 S i S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 2,994 2,243 1,719 1,094 12 8
Observations
Number of 1,115 666 325 143 0 0
Violations
Percentage 37.24 29.69 18.91 13.07 0 0
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.73 0.61 0.76 0.60 0 0
Standard 0.81 0.66 1.04 0.76 0 0
Deviation
t-statistic for 29.97*** 23.98*** 13.30*** 9.51*** - -
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 3.12*** 1.69* -
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of ex ante violations of the put-call parity (2a)
before and after the introduction of SPDRs.  An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation
persists into the following trading day.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8  is the percent of proceeds available to S
short sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** i
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.33
TABLE 10
Ex Ante Violations of Put-Call Parity (2b) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 8  = 0.99, t > 0 S i S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 2,143 2,932 1,131 1,618 0 0
Observations
Number of 509 1,049 116 320 0 0
Violations
Percentage 23.75 35.78 10.26 19.78 0 0
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.66 0.74 0.85 0.83 0 0
Standard 0.76 0.80 0.93 0.98 0 0
Deviation
t-statistic for 19.79*** 29.77*** 9.84*** 15.12*** - -
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 1.78* 0.22 -
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of ex ante violations of the put-call parity (2b)
before and after the introduction of SPDRs.  An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation
persists into the following trading day.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index
options from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8  is the percent of proceeds available to S
short sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** i
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.34
TABLE 11
Ex Ante Violations of the Box Spread (3a) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 6,691 6,389 3,604 3,399
Observations
Number of 1,335 1,153 375 258
Violations
Percentage 19.95 18.05 10.41 7.59
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.71 0.68 0.80 0.82
Standard 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.74
Deviation
t-statistic for 35.67*** 31.03*** 21.00*** 17.51***
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 0.90 -0.33
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of ex ante violations of the box spread (3a) before
and after the introduction of SPDRs.  An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation persists
into the following trading day.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index options
from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8  is the percent of proceeds available to short S
sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** denote i
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.35
TABLE 12
Ex Ante Violations of the Box Spread (3b) Before and After the Introduction of SPDRs
8  = 1.0, t = 0 8  = 1.0, t > 0 S i S i
2/1/92- 1/29/93- 2/1/92- 1/29/93-
1/28/93 1/31/94 1/28/93 1/31/94
Frequency of Violations
Number of 7,620 6,987 4,240 3,842
Observations
Number of 1,586 1,315 457 342
Violations
Percentage 20.81 18.82 10.78 8.90
of Violations
Violations in Dollars
Mean 0.83 0.69 0.99 0.77
Standard 1.25 0.73 1.60 0.81
Deviation
t-statistic for 26.57*** 33.97*** 13.22*** 17.61***
nonzero mean
t-statistic for 3.80*** 2.30**
equality of
means
This table compares the frequency and dollar size of ex ante violations of the box spread (3b) before
and after the introduction of SPDRs.  An ex ante violation occurs when a particular violation persists
into the following trading day.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index options
from February 1, 1992 through January 31, 1994.  8  is the percent of proceeds available to short S
sellers of stock and t is the cost of transactions in calls, puts, or shares.  Asterisks *,**, or *** denote i
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.36
Table 13
Bootstrap Tobit Regression Analysis of the Determinants of the Size of Violations
Independent Call Put Boundary Put-Call Put-Call Box Spread  Box Spread 
Variable Boundary (1b) Parity Parity
(1a) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Constant -1.5367 2.5579 4.1200 -2.0376 3.1263 3.0626
(-2.60)*** (5.16)*** (0.47) (-2.85)*** (8.73)*** (8.26)***
ln*S/X -1* 0.3150 0.1875 0.1623 0.1102 0.0481 0.0612
(24.96)*** (25.66)*** (16.82)*** (12.20)*** (5.99)*** (7.35)***
Volume 0.000019 -0.000024 -0.000002 -0.000024 -0.000003 0.000001
(2.75)*** (-4.23)*** (-0.50) (-5.09)*** (-1.95)* (1.08)
Open Interest -0.000019 -0.000008 -0.000010 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001
(-12.81)*** (-8.51)*** (-12.54)*** (-1.40) (-0.11) (-2.64)***
)S&P500 0.1096 -0.0863 0.1935 -0.2383 -0.0177 0.0079
(31.74)*** (-29.45)*** (37.36)*** (-50.84)*** (-8.87)*** (4.12)***
S&P500 0.0173 -0.0295 -0.0045 0.0018 -0.0026 -0.0015
(11.54)*** (-23.81)*** (-2.62)*** (1.00) (-2.74)*** (-1.64)* 
Term to -5.4288 -3.2735 -1.5104 2.5459 -0.0249 0.0210
Maturity (-56.38)*** (-58.16)*** (-19.62)*** (43.06)*** (-0.44) (0.36)
Strike Price -0.0090 0.0263 -0.0018 0.0026 - -
(-27.78)*** (79.65)*** (-4.25)*** (6.10)***
Difference in - - - - 0.0005 0.0007
Strikes (1.66)* (2.64)***
Average - - - - 0.0009 0.0001
Strike (2.48)** (0.27)
Time -0.0012 0.0012 -0.0009 0.0013 0.0003 0.0001
(-5.52)*** (11.21)*** (-3.70)*** (5.16)*** (2.04)** (0.92)
F-statistic 40,182*** 36,419*** 28,710*** 12,396*** 37,160*** 33,055***
This table contains bootstrapped Tobit regression results to examine the determinants of the dollar size of violations in each
pricing relationship.  The analysis uses daily data for the S&P 500 index and index options from February 1, 1992 through
January 31, 1994.  ln*S/X -1* is a measure of liquidity where S is the S&P 500 index value and X is the strike price.  For
the spread  relationships ((3a) and (3b)) the liquidity measure is the average liquidity across the two options.  Volume and
open interest are for the specific options.  )S&P500 is the change in the S&P 500 index from the previous day’s close and
S&P500 is the closing value of the index.  Term to maturity is the time in years until the option expires.  Strike price is the
exercise price of the option(s) where we include both the absolute value of the difference in strike prices and the average
strike price for the spread relationships.  Finally, Time is a counter for the trading date and is included to measure the trend
in pricing violations over time.  The F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero.
Asterisks *,**, or *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.